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White Plains

The Prosecutor as a
"Minister of Justice"

T

hese are heady times for
prosecutors. Gone are the
days when the Supreme
Court every other week, it seemed,
would invoke a new due process
right for criminal defendants; when
prosecutors would frantically
prepare for strange new hearings
labeled "Mapp", "Huntley", and
"Wade"; would be embroiled in sensational, political trials-Harlem 6;
Chicago 7; Harrisburg 8; Boston 5;
Panther 21-only to be rebuked by
defense counsel, the press, the
public, and juries. Prosecutors were
often on the defensive in those days.
Times have changed. Today,
prosecutors are on top of the world.
Their powers are enormous, and
constantly reinforced by sympathetic legislatures and courts. The
"awful instruments of the criminal
law," as Justice Frankfurter described the system,1 are today supplemented with broad new crimes, 2
easier proof requirements,3 heavier
sentencing laws, 4 and an extremely
cooperative judiciary, from district
and state judges, to the highest
Court in the land.
8

Indeed, Supreme Court watchers, and 1 am one of them,
carefully analyze the oracles from
our Nation's legal equivalent of Mt.
Olympus, and try to discern trends.
Some trends are easy to decipher,
such as the Death of the Fourth
Amendment; the continuing drift
from adjudicative fair play, sym* The author is an Adjunct Professor of Law
at Pace University School of Law, and practices law in White Plains, New York. He was
a prosecutor for ten years in the offices of
Frank S. Hogan and Maurice H. Nadjari, and
has written extensively about prosecutorial
and police conduct.
1 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
343 (1943).
2 See, e,g. 18 U.S.c, §§. 1961 et. seq.
(Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act);
18 U,S,c, § 1952 (A) (murder for hire); 18
U,S,c, § 1952 (B) (commission of violent
crimes in aid of racketeering activity),

3 See 18 U,S,c, § 1623 (lessening proof requirements in perjury prosecutions);
Fed,R.Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E) (l~ssening proof requirements in conspiracy prosecutions, as interpreted in Bourjaily v. United States, 107
S,Ct, 2775 (1987),

4 See 21 U,S.c, § 841 (b)(l) (increasing
penalties for drug trafficking); 18 U.S,C. §
924 (c) (imposing mandatory penalty for use
of firearms during commission of violent
crime).
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bolized by the Due Process Revolution of the Nineteen-Sixties, to
crime control, epitomized by what I
have termed the CounterRevolution of Harmless Error;5 and
the increasing availability and use of
draconian forms of punishment,
whether labeled preventive detention, 6 consecutive jail sentences for
overlapping criminal acts,7 and
more and more executions. s
Another trend, more subtle,
perhaps, has been a change in the
role of the prosecutor. Twenty-five
years ago, in one of the great cases
of this or any generation - Brady
v. Maryland9 - the Supreme Court
could write this about the prosecutor's duty: "Society wins not
only when the gUilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair; our
system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly."IO
This statement was a kind of
banner under which enthusiastic
young men and women began legal
careers in prosecutors offices, particularly in the office of New York
County District Attorney Frank S.
Hogan. Indeed, the cover story of
one issue of the New York Times
Magazine profiled that office, under
the title: "Hogan's Office Is a Kind
of Ministry of Justice."l1 For a long
time it has been an accepted part of
the conventional legal wisdom,
translated into one of the principal
Standards of Criminal Justice of the
American Bar Association, that it is
the duty of the prosecutor "to seek
justice, not merely to convict."12
There are, however, serious
practical and conceptual difficulties
in squaring the prosecutor's function with that of a "l\Ilinister of
Justice." The concept was seriously
eroded in two important decisions
of the Supreme Court -Coolidge v.
New Hampshire13 and Gerstein v.
Pugh14-in which the Court
recognized that it is realistically impossible for a prosecutor to play the
dual roles of vigorous advocate and
protector of public justice. In
Coolidge, the Court said that the
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL MAY 1988

prosecutor is too heavily involved
in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" to pass on the sufficiency of a search warrant in a case
being investigated under his supervision. Only a judge is neutral and
impartial enough to do so. And in
Gerstein, the Court held that an information drafted by a prosecutor is
not "judicial" enough to provide an
objective guarantee of probable
cause comparable to that furnished
by a grand jury, because the prosecutor is inherently partisan, while
the grand jury is an arm of the
court.
Futhermore, anybody who has
carefully
followed
recent
developments in criminal justice,
and particularly the Surpreme
Court's treatment of prosecutorial
behavior, must view such references
to the prosecutor's purported justice
function with considerable skep-

5 Gershman, "The Harmless Error Rule:
Overlooking Violations of Constitutional
Rights," 14 West.B.J. 3 (1987).
6 United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095
(1987) (upholding 18 U.S.c. § 3142 (e) of Bail
Reform Act of 1984).
7 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333
(1981); United States v. Blocker, 802 F.2d
1102 (9th Cir. 1986).
S See "Rise in Executions Widening Debate,"
N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, p. 30. In McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987), the
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the
death penalty over claims that the penalty
was imposed disproportionately against
racial minorities. This decision may have involved the last major challenge to the death
penalty as violative of the Eighth Amendment's proscription against "cruel and
unusual punishments."

9
10

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ld. at 87.

11 Mayer, "Hogan's Office is a kind of
Ministry of Justice," N. Y. Times Magazine,
July 23, 1967, p. 7.
12 ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice,
3-1.1(c) (1980).
13 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
14 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

9
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ticism. This is not to suggest that
prosecutors by and large behave unfairly. They do not. However, the
prosecutor's role is not that of a
justice-giver, but of an advocate, a
"Champion of the People," in the
same way that defense counsel's role
is not a defender of abstract justice,
but, rather, a Champion of the
Defendant. Frequent ceremonial
language about the prosecutor's
quasi-judicial function15 is not only
misleading, but may be detrimental.
It places the prosecutor in an
untenable conflict, forcing him constantly to walk a tightrope, and it
invites the judiciary to display a
kind of obeisance towards the prosecutor, suggesting that he or she
stands above the fray, omnipotent
and infallible.
To be sure, the prosecutor has a
fundamental commitment to fair
dealing, not foul play.16 The respect,
and success, of any prosecutor's office depends on a high degree of
skill, good judgment, and fairness.
If the prosecutor plays fairly and by
the rules, justice probably will work
itself out under our system of adversarial testing. However, to the extent that some courts, particularly
the Supreme Court, continue to
evince a consistent and unyielding
philosophy of judicial permissiveness in the face of prosecutorial excesses, many prosecutors will get the wrong message,
namely, that misconduct pays.17
And to the extent that bar
disciplinary committees wink at
prosecutorial excesses, the message
is reinforced. 18
Clearly, prosecutors have legal
and ethical obligations different
from their defense counterparts.
Prosecutors are guided by stricter
rules, many of which are embodied
in the constitution. Moreover, in
contrast to defense counsel, prosecutors wield tremendous power
and tremendous discretion. The juxtaposition of such power and discretion can be dangerous, especially if
courts display restraint, passivity,
and even withdrawal in the face of

prosecutorial misbehavior. Indeed,
such combination can be lethal. For
example, in the recent capital case of
Darden v. Wainwright,19 the prosecutor, among other things,
characterized the defendant as an
"animal;" told the jury that the only
guarantee against his future crimes
would be to execute him; that he
should have "a leash on him;" and
that he should have "his face blown
away by a shotgun." Darden's trial
was "not perfect," said the Supreme
Court in upholding his conviction
and death sentence. "Few are." "But
neither was it fundamentally
unfair. "19.
Obviously, we can never know
to what extent the jury in finding
guilt and imposing death, was influenced by the prosecutor's
outrageous remarks. Was Darden
trea ted unfairly? The answer
depends, in part, on where one sits.
One of the major problems with the
Supreme Court's prosecutorial
jurisprudence - and that of appellate courts generally - is that
these courts look at trial proceedings retrospectively, and can
only guess, quantitatively or
qualitatively, at the prejudicial impact of such misconduct, or its influence on the fairness of the trial. 20
To be sure, the Supreme Court
has not tolerated every form of prosecutorial misconduct. In one case
- Batson v. Kentucky21 - the
Court at long last outlawed the pernicious prosecutorial practice of
peremptorily challenging minority
jurors from jury service. Bt;ltson, as
well as Vasquez v. Hillery,22 which
dealt with grand jury discrimination, are clearly long overdue and
are to be applauded. However, they
involve equal protection concerns to
which the Court has displayed far
greater sensitivity than to due process concerns. Indeed, virtually
every important decision of the
Supreme Court over the past several
terms addressing the prosecutor's
conduct involved a lower court
judgment - state or federal which had sustained the defendant's

10

claim of improper prosecutorial
behavior. In virtually every case,
the Supreme Court reversed. It also
should be noted that among the
dozens of summary reversals by the
Court - done without briefs or oral
argument - well over 90% were
decided in the prosecutor's favor. 23
Any lingering notion that the
prosecutor is obligated to dispense
justice has been dispelled by recent
decisions of the Supreme Court. For
example, the increasingly expansive
use of the harmless error doctrine is
one of the principal themes in the
Court's treatment of prosecutorial
misconduct. Thus, in United States
v. Mechanik,24 the Court for the
first time held that prosecutorial
misconduct in the grand jury,
reviewed on appeal following a conviction, could be harmless error.
Similarly. in United States v. Lane,25
the Court held for the first time that
improper conduct in mischarging
crimes, reviewed on appeal following a conviction, could be harmless
error. Further, in United States v.
Hasting,26 the Court held that lower

15

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7
(1985), quoting Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
16 Berger v. United States, supra.
17 See Rose v. Clark, 106 Sup.Ct. 3101, 3112
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also
Gershman, "Why Prosecutors Misbehave,"
22 Crim. L. Bull. 131 (1986).
18 Bar Committees rarely impose discipline
on offending prosecutors. But see In re Rook,
276 Ore. 695, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976) (misconduct in plea bargaining). It is Virtually
unheard of for disciplinary sanctions to be
imposed for misconduct in the courtroom.
19 106 Sup.Ct. 2464, 2471-73 (1986).
On March 15, 1988, Willie Darden was
executed in Florida's electric chair. N. Y.
Times, March 16, 1988, p. A15.
20 See R. Traynor, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR (1969); Note, "Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence" 34 Ind. L. J. 477, 486 (1959).
21 106 S.O. 1712 (1986).

19>

106 S.O. 617 (1986).
See United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S.
453,458 (1985) (dissenting opinion).

22

23

24

475 U.S. 66 (1986).

25

474 U.S. 438 (1986).

26

461 U.S. 499 (1983).
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federal courts could not use their
supervisory powers to discipline errant prosecutors who had consistently violated that circuit's rules.
These courts were ordered to apply
the harmless error test instead.
It is in the area of nondisclosure
of exculpatory evidence, however,
that the Supreme Court has
rendered most meaningless notions
of fundamental fairness and constitutional protections afforded
criminal defendants. This is the one
area above all else that depends on
the integrity and good faith of the
prosecutor. If the prosecutor hides
evidence, it .will probably never be
known. Moreover, as an advocate,
the prosecutor, if candid, will concede that his or her inclination is not
to disclose. By way of rough
analogy, we do not enjoy paying
taxes. Since the government's
auditing powers are severly limited,
the tax system depends largely on
the integrity of the individual taxpayer. Many evaders are not apprehended. But if a tax cheat is
caught, the chances are good that
the courts will impose severe sanctions, mostly for deterrent purposes.
So, it seems, should it be with
prosecu torial suppression of
evidence. But in this one area,
where the prosecutor's fairness is so
dramatically put to the test, the
Supreme Court has continued to
default. First, according to the
Court, the prosecutor's good or bad
faith in secreting evidence is irrelevant. 27 But surely if one seeks to
deter prosecutors from hiding exculpatory evidence, willful violations should be severely punished.
Not so, according to the Court. The
hidden evidence has to be
"material," that is, as the' Court
wrote recently· in United States v.
Bagley,28 a case involving a prosecutor's false representations to
defense counsel about monetary inducements
to
government
witnesses, it has to be shown that
but for the nondisclosure, the verdict would have been different.

Examples of this quagmire
spawned by the Court are
numerous. In Smith v. Phillips,29 the
prosecutor suppressed information
that a juror in a murder trial had
sought employment with the same
prosecutor's office. The Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit,
which had granted the habeas corpus petition. The Court said first,
that there was no showing of actual
bias, nor, secondly, any showing
that the defendant was prejudiced
by the nondisclosure. Ethical standards may be overlooked, said
Justice Rehnquist for the majority,
because the "touchstone of due process analysis is the fairness of the
trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor." But, quaere, how does one
demonstrate prejudice if the juror
swears: "I was not prejudiced"?
Similarly, in United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal,30 the prosecutor
ordered the deportation of illegalalien eyewitnesses to the defendant's
crime before they could be interviewed by defense counsel. The
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, which had reversed the conviction. The prompt deportation of
illegal-aliens is an overriding duty of
the Executive Branch, the Court
said, to which the Court will defer
absent a plausible showing that the
lost evidence would be material and
favorable to the defense. Of course,
as the dissent correctly pointed out,
showing the importance of evidence
without an opportunity to examine
that evidence can be exceedingly difficult. And in California v.
Trombetta,31 the Court reversed the
state court which had reversed the
defendant's intoxicated driving conviction because the prosecutor had
failed to preserve as evidence the
contents of a breathilyzer test. The
evidence was not sufficiently
material, said the Court. To be
material, a defendant is required to
show that the evidence possessed an
exculpatory quality that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed, and was of such nature
that the defendant would be unable

12

to obtain comparable evidence.
Again, how does a defendant show
the importance of evidence that is
no longer available?
Moreover, the Supreme Court's
undue deference to the prosecutor,
as noted above, can result in
wholesale abdication of traditional
judicial functions. With due respect
to the judiciary, the prosecutor is
the most dominant and powerful official in the criminal justice system.
The prosecutor runs the show. The
prosecutor decides whether or not
to bring criminal charges; who to
charge; what charges to bring;
whether a defendant will stand trial,
plead guilty, or be conferred with
immunity. The prosecutor even
possesses broad sentencing powers,
as the New York Court of Appeals'
decision in People v. Farrar illustrates. 32 The prosecutor enjoys
virtual independence. He has no
superiors. He cannot be compelled
to bring charges or to terminate
them. Moreover, in using these vast
powers, the prosecutor is presumed
to act in good faith. The Supreme
Court wrote a few months ago in a
case involving the use of a private
prosecutor: "Between the private
life of the citizen and the public
glare of criminal accusation stands
the prosecutor, with the power to
employ the full machinery of the
state in scrutinizing any given individual. "33 And, one might add, to
stigmatize that person for life. To be
sure, the prosecutor's vast charging
discretion is contrained by a few
modest doctrines: the prosecutor
Continued on Page 63

United States v, Agurs, 427 U.S, 97
(1976); Giglio v, United States, 405 U.S, 150

27

(1972),
28

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985),

29

455 U,S, 209 (1982),

30

458 U,S, 858 (1982),

31

467 U,S, 479 (1984),

52 N,Y,2d 304, 419 N,E,2d 864, 437
N,Y,S,2d 961. (1981),
33 Young v, United States ex reI. Vuitton et
Fils S,A" 107 $,Ct. 2124, 2141 (1987).
32
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The Prosecutor as a
"Minister of Justice"
Continued from Page 12

must not be unfairly selective, vindictive, or demagogic in using his
charging powers. These doctrines,
however, are rarely invoked, and
hardly ever successful.
No area of criminal justice is
more complex and controversial
than that of the prosecutor's discretion, particularly as it relates to
charging, plea bargaining, dismissing, and granting immunity. It is
here, in my judgment, that the
courts should exercise more
vigilance and control. Yet here,
more than any other area, the courts
have withdrawn more than ever. 34
Several recent cases illustrate the ineffectiveness of doctrine as it relates
to the prosecutor's discretion. In
Wayte v. United States,35 for example, the defendant, a vocal opponent of the Selective Service system,
was one of a handful of nonregistrants who was prosecuted, out
of nearly a million non-vocal nonregistrants. Wayte made a colorable
showing .that he was impermissibly
targeted for prosecution based on
his exercise of First Amendment
rights. He sought to discover information in the prosecutor's files.
When the prosecutor resisted, the
district court dismissed the indictment. The Supreme Court treated
the case not as a discovery problem.
The Court found that there was no

showing that the defendant was
selected "because of his protest activities," a showing of prosecutorial
motivation that seems almost impossible to prove. Given the
presumption of prosecutorial good
faith, the prosecutor's expertise, and
the prosecutor's law enforcement
plans and priorities, matters which
are ill-suited to judicial review, said
the Court, there would be no interference with the prosecutor's
discretion, even in this obvious instance of a prima facie case of selective prosecution.
Unfair selectivity is matched by
prosecutorial retaliation in the form
of increased charges after defendants raise statutory or constitutional
claims.
Prosecutors,
however, may not be vindictive in
response to a defendant's exercise of
rights. Proving prosecutorial vindictiveness, however, is another matter. The courts have indulged the
prosecutor in this area as well.
Thus, prosecutorial retaliation by
increasing charges after a plea offer
is refused is not legally vindictive,
said the Supreme Court in United
States v. Goodwin,36 reaffirming
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,37 even
though
such
tactics
may
demonstrate actual vindictiveness.
The concerns are purely pragmatic.
Prosecutors need this leverage to
run the system. If prosecutors could
not threaten defendants by "upping

the ante;" they would obtain fewer
pleas. Further, in virtually every
pretrial context in which prosecutors have increased charges
after defendants have exercised
rights, courts uniformly have found
no vindictiveness. This can result in
some patently unfair decisions. In
one recent New York case,38 the prosecutor charged the defendant with
perjury after his motion to suppress
evidence was granted. The hearing
court found that the defendant was
a credible witness, and the police
witnesses were not. This is a blatant
instance of prosecutorial vindictiveness, or alternatively, of prosecutorial bad faith, particularly
after a judge already had made a
credibility determination in the
defendant's favor.
Prosecutorial behavior in plea
bargaining is standardless and often
highly coercive. A plea bargain is a
constitutional contract. The prosecutor must keep his promise.
However, the prosecutor's decisions
usually are deferred to by the
Courts, and the prosecutor's interpretation of the bargain usually controls. A good example of this is
Ricketts v. Adamson,39 decided by
the Supreme Court last June. The
case arose out of the murder of
Arizona newspaper reporter Don
Bolles. The prosecutor and Adamson agreed that Adamson would
testify fully and completely in
63
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"Minister of Justice"
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must not be unfairly selective, vindictive, or demagogic in using his
charging powers. These doctrines,
however, are rarely invoked, and
hardly ever successful.
No area of criminal justice is
more complex and controversial
than that of the prosecutor's discretion, particularly as it relates to
charging, plea bargaining, dismissing, and granting immunity. It is
here, in my judgment, that the
courts should exercise more
vigilance and control. Yet here,
more than any other area, the courts
34
have withdrawn more than ever.
Several recent cases illustrate the ineffectiveness of doctrine as it relates
to the prosecutor's discretion. In
Wayte v. United States,35 for example, the defendant, a vocal opponent of the Selective Service system,
was one of a handful of nonregistrants who was prosecuted, out
of nearly a million non-vocal nonregistrants. Wayte made a colorable
showing that he was impermissibly
targeted for prosecution based on
his exercise of First Amendment
rights. He sought to discover information in the prosecutor's files.
When the prosecutor resisted, the
district court dismissed the indictment. The Supreme Court treated
the case not as a discovery problem.
The Court found that there was no
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showing that the defendant was
selected "because of his protest activities," a showing of prosecutorial
motivation that seems almost impossible to prove. Given the
presumption of prosecutorial good
faith, the prosecutor's expertise, and
the prosecutor's law enforcement
plans and priorities, matters which
are ill-suited to judicial review, said
the Court, there would be no interference with the prosecutor's
discretion, even in this obvious instance of a prima facie case of selective prosecution.
Unfair selectivity is matched by
prosecutorial retaliation in the form
of increased charges after defendants raise statutory or constituProsecutors,
tional
claims.
however, may not be vindictive in
response to a defendant's exercise of
rights. Proving prosecutorial vindictiveness, however, is another matter. The courts have indulged the
prosecutor in this area as well.
Thus, prosecutorial retaliation by
increasing charges after a plea offer
is refused is not legally vindictive,
said the Supreme Court in United
States v. Goodwin,36 reaffirming
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,17 even
such
tactics
may
though
demonstrate actual vindictiveness.
The concerns are purely pragmatic.
Prosecutors need this leverage to
run the system. If prosecutors could
not threaten defendants by "upping

the ante," they would obtain fewer
pleas. Further, in virtually every
pretrial context in which prosecutors have increased charges
after defendants have exercised
rights, courts uniformly have found
no vindictiveness. This can result in
some patently unfair decisions. In
one recent New York case, 38 the prosecutor charged the defendant with
perjury after his motion to suppress
evidence was granted. The hearing
court found that the defendant was
a credible witness, and the police
witnesses were not. This is a blatant
instance of prosecutorial vindictiveness, or alternatively, of prosecutorial bad faith, particularly
after a judge already had made a
credibility determination in the
defendant's favor.
Prosecutorial behavior in plea
bargaining is standardless and often
highly coercive. A plea bargain is a
constitutional contract. The prosecutor must keep his promise.
However, the prosecutor's decisions
usually are deferred to by the
Courts, and the prosecutor's interpretation of the bargain usually controls. A good example of this is
Ricketts v. Adamson,3 9 decided by
the Supreme Court last June. The
case arose out of the murder of
Arizona newspaper reporter Don
Bolles. The prosecutor and Adamson agreed that Adamson would
testify fully and completely in

return for a plea to a reduced
murder charge and a reduced
sentence. Adamson testified at the
murder trial of two other codefendants and was sentenced. All
told, Adamson made 14 court appearances in 5 separate cases - 31
days of testimony and over 200 interview sessions with the prosecutor
- but balked at testifying at a
retrial after the above murder convictions were reversed. He claimed
that his plea agreement, reasonably
construed, did not require such additional testimony. The prosecutor
disagreed, claimed that Adamson
breached his agreement, and notwithstanding Adamson's willingness
to accede to the prosecutor's interpretation, nonetheless indicted and
convicted Adamson of first degree
murder, and obtained a death
sentence. A majority of the Court
upheld the prosecutor's interpretation of the agreement, and found
there was no double jeopardy bar to
Adamson's conviction. The four
dissenting Justices, on the other
hand, said that Adamson had not
breached, that there was a
reasonable basis for his interpretation, and that the matter should
have been submitted to the courts
for resolution. Overzealousness
may be an appropriate characterization of the prosecutor's conduct
here. He behaved more like an
"Avenging Angel" than a "Minister
of Justice."
Although prosecutors may need
"leverage" in plea bargaining, they
do not need leverage when seeking a
defendant's agreement to release the
police or municipality from civil
liability following an arrest, and using the dismissal of charges as a
weapon to compel such agreement.
In Newton v. Rumery, 40 the First
Circuit, as had several other circuits, found such release-dismissal
agreements invalid as contravening
public policy. The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the agreement
was voluntarily and knowingly
entered into, as in the case of plea
bargains. But as the dissent pointed

out, the release-dismissal agreement Such sanctions are either nonexisis inherently coercive and unfair, tent or not used. Prosecutors are
there being no mutuality of advan- generally immune from civil liabili44
tage, as there is in plea bargaining. ty. Imposition of discipline by bar
45
Moreover, there is a conflict of in- committees is virtually unheard of.
terest between the prosecutor's in- Contempt rulings by trial judges are
terest in furthering legitimate law rare. 46 Appellate reversals may
enforcement objectives, and at the punish society more than the prosame time protecting the town, secutor. 47 And although appellate
police, or other public officials, courts occasionally issue stinging
rebukes, the decisions rarely if ever
from civil liability.
Finally, as noted above, the identify the offending prosecutor by
standards applied by the courts to name. Perhaps if the prosecutor
prosecutors often are unrealistic. were forced to appear before the apClearly, the search for a pro- pellate tribunal to defend his or her
secutorial mens rea, or guilty mind, conduct, the incidence of courtroom
is hazardous at best. Prosecutors do misconduct might diminish.
Although not a Minister of
not confess their misdeeds, and
presumptions are rarely invoked. Justice, the prosecutor's role may
Thus, in Oregon v. Kennedy,41 a well be the most exacting of any
case in which a prosecutor's miscon- public official. But by the same
duct provoked the defendant to ask token, the public has a right to refor a mistrial, the Supreme Court quire of that official the highest
was asked to decide whether retrial measure of responsibility, professhould be barred on double jeopar- sionalism, and integrity. Prody grounds. Several courts, in- secutors who use their prodigious
cluding some New York courts, powers gracefully and fairly are no
looked to the seriousness of the less effective as Champions of the
misconduct in deciding whether to People, and will be far worthier of
bar retrial.42 The Supreme Court, respect and admiration. Courts and
however, adopted the most restric- bar associations have to send out
tive approach possible, requiring better messages, and provide
proof that the prosecutor's specific stronger incentives for prosecutors
intention was to goad the defendant to behave fairly.
into seeking a mistrial, rather than 34 See A. Goldstein, THE PASSIVE
prejudicing the defendant generally. JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCREProving such specific intent, said the TION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981).
four dissenting justices, is "almost 35 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
36 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
inconceivable. 43
For some prosecutors, the temp- 37 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
tation to cross over the allowable 38 People v. Stephens, 122 A.D.2d 608, 505
ethical line often must be irresisti- N.Y.S.2d 393 (4th Dept. 1986).
ble, particularly because miscon- 39 107 S.Ct. 2680 (1987).
40 107 S.Ct. 1187 (1987).
duct frequently creates distinct ad41 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
vantages to prosecutors in helping
to win their case. It takes a steadfast ' See People v. Cavallerio, 104 Misc.2d 436,
428 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1980). See also Petrucelli
effort on the part of prosecutors to v. Smith, 544 F.Supp. 627 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
maintain high moral and profes- 43 456 U.S. at 688.
sional standards necessary to avoid 44 Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
such temptations. Regrettably,
45 See B. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL
many courts, notably the Supreme MISCONDUCT § 13.6 (1985).
Court, have provided few incentives 46 See B. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL
to prosecutors to avoid misconduct. MISCONDUCT § 13,3 (1985).
As with punishment generally, 47 See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d
1173, 1182-86 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
deterring misconduct requires the 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
imposition of realistic sanctions.
l'll
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